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Abstract—Massive machine-type communication (mMTC) is a
new focus of services in fifth generation (5G) communication
networks. The associated stringent delay requirement of end-
to-end (E2E) service deliveries poses technical challenges. In
this paper, we propose a joint random access and data trans-
mission protocol for mMTC to guarantee E2E service quality
of different traffic types. First, we develop a priority-queueing-
based access class barring (ACB) model and a novel effective
capacity is derived. Then, we model the priority-queueing-
based ACB policy as a non-cooperative game, where utility is
defined as the difference between effective capacity and access
penalty price. We prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium (NE) of the non-cooperative game, which is also a
sub-modular utility maximization problem and can be solved
by a greedy updating algorithm with convergence to the unique
NE. To further improve the efficiency, we present a price-update
algorithm, which converges to a local optimum. Simulations
demonstrate the performance of the derived effective capacity
and the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
Index Terms—Massive machine-type communications
(mMTC), random access, effective capacity, quality of service
(QoS), non-cooperative game, sub-modular function.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid penetration of emerging automated services,
machine-type communication (MTC) has become a focus of
new services in fifth generation (5G) communication networks
[1]. For example, the smart cities span a wide variety of
service applications, from traffic management to grid power
distribution, to urban security and environmental monitoring
[2], [3]; industrial wireless sensor devices bring the industry
automation into the era of Industry 4.0 by providing the
ubiquitous perception to improve the production efficiency [4],
[5]; health–oriented wearable devices offer biometric mea-
surements such as heart rate, perspiration level, and oxygen
level in the bloodstream [6], [7]. Industry analysts predict
that 50 billion devices will be interconnected via mobile
networks worldwide by 2020 [8]. Different from human-
driven communication, MTC involves a massive number of
devices with low-complexity and low-power, referred to as
massive machine-type communications (mMTC). For mMTC,
traffic overloading on the random access channel (RACH)
is a dominate factor causing performance bottleneck due to
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simultaneous activation of devices. To alleviate the traffic
arrival burstiness, the access class barring (ACB) [9] and back-
off procedure [10] are proposed.
Another challenge is how to guarantee heterogeneous qual-
ity of-service (QoS), i.e., delay and reliability for devices
with different traffic types [11], [12]. For example, MTC
for industrial automation requires extremely small delay and
packer error probability (PER) [13]. Although ACB or back-
off procedure can prevent simultaneous massive access from
activated devices, they result in a degradation of QoS. Thus,
QoS-aware random access for mMTC has recently drawn
attentions from researchers. An analytical model is proposed
in [14] to calculate maximum access delay for a distributed
queueing-based random access protocol. In [15], the MTC
network is modeled as a Beta/M/1 queueing system, where
service time of the RACH procedure follows an exponential
distribution. In [16], a general model is developed for the
RACH procedure. The impact of short packets of machine-
type services on the achievable rate is considered in [17].
In traditional communications, the Shannon’s channel coding
theorem is employed under the assumption of infinity block-
length, while for a finite block-length, a novel effective capac-
ity is developed to guarantee statistical QoS for MTC. In [18],
a cross-layer framework is proposed based on the effective
bandwidth theory to optimize the packet dropping policy,
power allocation policy, and bandwidth allocation policy under
the QoS constraint. A probabilistic bound for RACH access
delay is derived using stochastic network calculus in [19].
The overall performance of MTC depends on the per-
formance not only in the RACH phase, but also in data
transmission phase. The backlog status of each transmission
queue of MTC devices, depending on traffic arrival and service
processes, affects the number of devices activated in both
RACH phase and data transmission phase. As a result, a joint
consideration of both RACH procedure and data transmission
is a key to capture the performance of MTC. Ruan et al.
in [20] consider a scenario where devices can transmit data
at a random access slot only when it decides to transmit
a random preamble sequence and other devices have not
occupied the preamble. The transmission process is formulated
as an infinite horizon average cost Markov decision process
(MDP). In [21], a queueing model is developed for MTC under
the assumption that a device is activated when the number
of packets in its queue is larger than a threshold and all
the packets in the queue are transmitted upon one successful
preamble contention. Wiriaatmadja et al. derive a closed-form
formula for throughput as a function of the number of resource
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2block allocated for the PRACH and the traffic load [22].
According to the closed-form formula, a hybrid protocol is
proposed to maximize the expected throughput.
How MTC devices with differentiated services should con-
tend to access the RACH and be scheduled to transmit data for
heterogeneous QoS provisioning needs in-depth investigation
[23], [24]. First, the RACH and data transmission phases are
correlated, in presence of transmission queueing dynamics
among devices. A unified analytical framework to quantify
the QoS-provisioning capabilities in both random access and
data transmission is essential. Moreover, how to guarantee
differentiated QoS requirements of MTC devices supporting
multiple traffic types is challenging. For massive access from
MTC devices, a centralized control solution corresponds to
a large communication overhead due to global information
exchange with a large number of devices. Thus, a distributed
QoS provisioning scheme is desired.
In this paper, we propose a joint random access and data
transmission protocol to guarantee the end-to-end (E2E) QoS
of different traffic types in mMTC. To deal with the aforemen-
tioned challenges, in this paper, we propose a hybrid random
access and data transmission protocol to guarantee the end-to-
end (E2E) QoS of different traffic types in mMTC. The main
contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• First, we develop a priority-queueing-based ACB model
and derive a novel effective capacity, taking into account
the random access and short packet transmissions. The
priority-queueing-based ACB model not only alleviates
the traffic arrival burstiness, but also guarantees the
differentiated QoS requirements of MTC devices.
• Second, based on the derived effective capacity, the
barring policy is modeled as a non-cooperative game.
We prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash equi-
librium (NE) in the noncooperative game. Furthermore,
a distributed iterative algorithm that converges to the
equilibrium point is proposed.
• Thirdly, to improve the efficiency of NE, we provide a
price-update algorithm, which converges to a locally opti-
mal point of the effective capacity optimization problem.
Simulation results show the performance of the novel
effective capacity and the effectiveness of our proposed
algorithms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
system model is presented in Section II. In Section III, we
derive a new effective capacity, considering both RACH and
data transmission phases. In Section IV, we present two game-
theoretic barring policies with QoS guarantee. In Section V,
simulation results are provided, followed by conclusions in
Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the uplink of an mMTC system, composed of a
BS and N MTC devices which are randomly and uniformly
distributed within the coverage of the BS, as shown in Fig. 1.
Each device generates K types of traffic, indexed by 1, 2, ...K.
We assume the smaller the index, the higher the transmission
priority. Each device has K First-Input-First-Output (FIFO)
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Fig. 1. An example of system model including one BS and N devices with
three queue to transmit K types of traffic .
transmission queues for the K types of traffic, respectively.
Time is partitioned into a sequence of time slots, the duration
of which is constant and denoted by Td. Packet arrivals of the
k-th traffic type at the n-th device over each time slot follows
an independent and identically distributed Bernoulli process
with probability pn. The amount of the k-th traffic packet (in
the unit of bit per second) at the n-th device at the t-th slot,
denoted by an,k[t], follows an exponential distribution with
mean L¯n,k.
A conventional device initiates access attempts to the BS
at the time when the transmission queues are non-empty.
However, the simultaneous activation of a large number of
devices causes access performance degradation for mMTC.
To deal with massive access attempts with bursty traffic
arrivals, a priority-queueing-based ACB is employed to reduce
contention collisions of random access for QoS provisioning.
Suppose the k-th queue of the n-th device is non-empty. If all
the k− 1 queues that have a lower index with higher priority
than the k-th queue are empty, the k-th queue can be activated
with probability dn,k.
For uplink transmissions, time is partitioned into a sequence
of transmission superframes, each of which consists of a
random access phase followed by a data transmission phase,
depicted in Fig. 2. The durations of a random access phase
and a data transmission phase are denoted by Ts and Tf ,
respectively, and the total transmission duration is denoted
by Tu. The activated devices contend for preambles in Ts.
Upon a successful contention, data is transmitted within a
duration of Tf using Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple
Access (OFDMA) techniques. Otherwise, the device will try
again to access the BS in the random access phase of next
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Fig. 2. An illustration of MAC operations in each transmission superframe,
including the random access phase with two preambles and the data trans-
mission phase.
superframe. We assume that Ts  Tf to alleviate the signaling
overhead due to random access. In general, the duration of
each superframes Tu is an integer multiple of time slots Td.
The wireless channel from a device to the BS is modeled as
a Rayleigh block fading, i.e., the channel remains unchanged
during a superframe of duration Tu, and changes indepen-
dently between consecutive superframes.
In the random access phase, a device attempts to connect
to the BS based on a standard four step random access (RA)
procedure. The detailed RA procedure for the uplink is as
follows: 1) The device uniformly and randomly selects and
then transmits one RA preamble from M preambles in the
physical random access channel (PRACH); 2) The BS sends
random access responses (RARs) through the physical down-
link shared channel (PDSCH) to devices whose preambles
are decoded successfully; 3) Devices specified in the received
RAR send the connection setup request messages; 4) If the
BS correctly decodes a connection request, it replies with
an acknowledgement to the device. In the data transmission
phase, we assume that the k-th queue of the n-th device
successfully occupies a data transmission channel with the
allocated bandwidth Bn during the period Tf , which consists
of Sn OFDM symbols. We calculate Sn by Sn =
Tf
a
Bn
c ,
where a is the duration of a OFDM symbol, c is the bandwidth
of a OFDM symbol.
III. QOS ANALYSIS OF MULTI-CLASS MTC
In this section, a novel analytical approach is proposed to
analyze the performance of the priority-queueing-based ACB
model, jointly considering the random access phase and the
data transmission phase.
In the context of large deviation theory [25], QoS is
characterized statistically by employing the QoS exponent
θ = {θn,k, n = 1, · · · , N, k = 1, · · · ,K}, as given by [26]
θn,k = − lim
Qthn,k→∞
log(Pr{Qn,k[∞] > Qthn,k})
Qthn,k
(1)
where Qn,k[t] is the length of transmission queue at the k-th
queue of the n-th device at slot t, Qthn,k is the threshold of
the queue length to guarantee the QoS of the k-th traffic type,
and Pr{Qn,k[∞] > Qthn,k} is the QoS-violation probability
that the queue length exceeds Qthn,k. In (1), θn,k provides the
exponential decaying rate of the probability that the threshold
is violated.
A. Effective Bandwidth of Multi-class MTC
For the arrival process an,k[t] at the k-th queue of the n-
th device, the effective bandwidth, denoted by An,k(θn,k),
specifies the minimum constant service rate for probabilistic
QoS guarantee. Given the Bernoulli traffic arrival, the effective
bandwidth (in bit/s) of the traffic is given by [27]
An,k(θn,k) = lim
t→∞
1
θn,kt
log(E{eθn,k
t∑
i=0
an,k[i]})
=
1
θn,kTd
log(
pn
1− θn,kL¯n,k + 1− pn).
(2)
B. Effective Capacity of Multi-class MTC
Service for the k-th queue at the n-th device can have one
of the following three states:
• Successful access state accounts for the case that all
queues of higher priority are empty, while the k-th queue
is not empty and tries to access to the BS, and the chosen
preamble is occupied only by the n-th device;
• Collided access state accounts for the case that all queues
of higher priority are empty, while the k-th queue is
not empty and tries to access to the BS, and the chosen
preamble is occupied by more than one device;
• Silence state accounts for the case that more than one
queue of higher priority is non-empty, and/or the k-th
queue does not try to access to the BS.
We denote successful access indicator variable as:
sn,k =
{
1, if the state is successful access state;
0, otherwise.
Let P n,kidle denote the probability of having an empty buffer
at the k-th queue of n-th device. Then, the probability that the
packet at the head of the k-th queue of the n-th device tries
to access the BS is given by
Pn,ka = dn,k
k−1∏
j=1
P n,jidle (1− P n,kidle ). (3)
The activation probability of n-th device is
Dn =
K∑
k=1
Pn,ka . (4)
As a result, the successful access probability of the k-th queue
of the n-th device is given by
Fn,ks =
∑
m∈M
1
M
Pn,ka
∏
l 6=n,l∈N
(
1− Dl
M
)
= Pn,ka
∏
l 6=n,l∈N
(
1− Dl
M
) (5)
where
(
1− DlM
)
is the probability that the l-th device does
not operate on the m-th preamble, and M is the number of
preambles.
For the short packet transmission, the achievable channel
coding rate (bits per channel use) of the successful access
state depends not only on the channel condition, but also on
4the finite blocklength Sn and the packet error probability εn,k,
which is given by [17]
rn,k ≈log2(1 +
Pn,kth Gn|Hn|2
N0
)
−
√√√√√√ 1Sn
1− 1(
1 +
Pn,kth Gn
N0
|Hn|2
)2
Q−1(εn,k)log2(e).
(6)
In (6), Q(x) =
∫∞
x
1√
2pi
e
−t2
2 dt is the Gaussian Q-function,
and Q−1(·) represents its inverse, N0 is the power of the
additive white Gaussian noise, Pn,kth is the transmit power of
the k-th queue of the n-th device, Gn is the mean path loss
attenuation coefficient (i.e., consisting of free-space loss and
shadowing effect) from the n-th device to the BS, Hn is the
Rayleigh fading coefficient with unit variance, and |Hn|2, n =
1, 2, ...N are independent and exponentially distributed ran-
dom variables with unit mean, i.e., |Hn|2 ∼ exp(1). From
(6), we notice that there is a penalty on the maximum
achievable rate since the finite blocklength makes the decoding
error probability nonnegligible. Note that a packet consists of
many payload bits, which are made up of information bits
(information payload) and additional bits, containing metadata
from the media access-control (MAC) layer and higher layers.
The payload bits are typically encoded into a block of Sn data
symbols (complex numbers) to increase reliability in packet
transmission.
Given the block Rayleigh fading during different transmis-
sion superframes, the effective capacity (in bit/s), denoted by
Cn,k(θn,k, dn,k,d−n, P
n,k
th ), specifies the maximum, consis-
tent, steady-state arrival rate at the input of the k-th queue of
the n-th device, under the QoS constraint, given by [17], [26]
Cn,k(θn,k, dn,k,d−n, P
n,k
th ) =
− 1
θn,kTu
log
{
Fn,ks (1− εn)EHn{e−θn,krn,kSn}
+1− Fn,ks (1− εn)
} (7)
In Eq. (7), EHn{·} is the expectation operation on small-scale
channel fading for the n-th device, d−n = {dj , j ∈ N − n},
dn = [dn,1, dn,2, . . . dn,K ] is barring strategy vector for device
n, Fn,ks (1−εn) is the successful transmission probability, and
rn,k is the achievable transmit rate, which is provided by Eq.
(6). The proposed effective capacity is different from that of
[17], considering the RACH procedure and ACB model.
C. Composition Results
If the assumptions of Gartner-Ellis theorem hold 1 [27], [28]
and there is a unique QoS exponent θ∗n,k that satisfies
An,k(θ
∗
n,k) = Cn,k(θ
∗
n,k, dn,k,d−n, P
n,k
th ) (8)
then the k-th queue of the n-th device is stable and
P (Qn,k[∞] ≥ Qthn,k) can be approximated by [27]
P (Qn,k[∞] ≥ Qthn,k) ≈ (1− P n,kidle )e(−θ
∗
n,kQ
th
n,k). (9)
1The Gartner-Ellis theorem assumptions require the function (i) exists for
all real θ, (ii) is strictly convex, and (iii) is essentially smooth.
Note that Eq. (8) is the related ties between (2) and (7), which
makes the effective capacity equal to the effective bandwidth,
in order to satisfy the QoS.
Given a delay bound, Dn,kmax, the probability that the steady-
state packet delay at the k-th queue of the n-th device exceeds
Dn,kmax is given by [28]
Pn,kth ≈ (1− P n,kidle )e−θ
∗
n,kAn,k(θ
∗
n,k)D
n,k
max . (10)
Given the Bernoulli traffic arrivals, P n,kidle is approximated as
θ∗n,kL¯n,k [27]. The empty buffer probability of the queue can
be also estimated by learning the parameters of the network
environments.
Theorem 1. Given QoS exponents θ =
{θn,k, n = 1, · · · , N, k = 1, · · · ,K}, the barring policy
{dn,k, n ∈ N, k ∈ K} and the traffic arrival process, the
transmit power Pn,kth of the k-th queue at the n-th device is
obtained by solving
Cn,k(θn,k, dn,k,d−n, P
n,k
th )
=
1
θ∗n,kTd
log(
pn
1− θn,kL¯n,k + 1− pn).
(11)
Note that (11) is obtained by substituting (2) and (7)
into (8), and can be solved using a bisection method,
since Cn,k(θn,k, dn,k,d−n, P
n,k
th ) monotonically increases
with Pn,kth , the proof of which is provided as follows:
The first-order derivative of (6) with respect to Pn,kth is
∂rn,k
∂Pn,kth
=
σn
ln 2(1 + Pn,kth σn)1− Q−1(εn,k)√Sn 1√(
1 + Pn,kth σn
)4
−
(
1 + Pn,kth σn
)2

(12)
where σn =
Gn|Hn|2
N0
. When the number of OFDM symbols
is sufficiently larger, we have
√
Sn ≥ Q−1(εn,k). Thus,
∂rn,k
∂Pn,kth
≥ 0. According to (7), we can readily prove that
Cn,k(θn,k, dn,k,d−n, P
n,k
th ) increases with rn,k. As a result,
Cn,k(θn,k, dn,k,d−n, P
n,k
th ) increases with P
n,k
th .
IV. BARRING POLICY UNDER QOS GUARANTEE
A. Distributed Game-Theoretic Barring Policy
The activation probability of a queue determines the arrival
rate and QoS of the traffic. The total performance in terms of
effective capacity can be optimized by adaptively allocating
the activation probability of all the queues over time based on
the channel condition and the service delay requirement. Let
Cn,k(dn,k,d−n)
∆
= Cn,k(θn,k, dn,k,d−n, P
n,k
th ). As a result,
the effective capacity maximization problem with constraints
on barring policy is formulated as
(P1) : max
{dn,k}
∑
n∈N
∑
k∈K
Cn,k(dn,k,d−n)
s.t. dmin ≤ dn,k ≤ dmax
(13)
where {dn,k} is the activation probability of k-th queue at n-th
device, and dkmin and d
k
max are the maximum and minimum
5activation probability of the traffic class k, respectively. Due
to the non-convexity of the (P1), it is difficult to obtain the
optimal solution. Besides, accurate channel information is
required for centralized computation, which is cost-ineffective
in the mMTC system.
The successful access in its essence is network resource
competition (e.g., preambles) among devices. As a result, it
can be modeled as a non-cooperative game, which is effective
to analyze the interactions among distributed decision makers
and to improve the performance of decentralized networks
[29]. Specifically, the priority-queuing-based access class bar-
ring policy across different devices is formulated as a non-
cooperative game, denoted by G = [N , {dn}n∈N , {Un}n∈N ],
where N = {1, . . . , N} is a set of players (i.e., devices), Un
is a utility (payoff) function of player n, as given by
Un(dn,d−n) =
∑
k∈K
Cn,k (dn,k,d−n). (14)
In (14), the effective capacity Cn,k (dn,k,d−n) can be re-
garded as the profit from channel access, given by
Cn,k (dn,k,d−n) =− 1
θn,kTs
log {1− dn,kΦn,k(d−n)}
(15)
where
Φn,k(d−n) =
(
1− EHn{e−θn,krn,kSn,k}
)
(1− εn)
k−1∏
j=1
Pn,jidle (1− Pn,kidle )
∏
l 6=n,l∈N
(
1−Dl 1
M
)
.
(16)
Given the game formulation, it is required to prove and
derive the Nash equilibrium point. Since Cn,k (dn,k,d−n)
increases with dn,k and there is no penalty for high activation
probability, it is verified that the NE point is {dn,k = dmax}.
The NE can be far from the optimal solution of (P1).
In order to improve the efficiency of the game, we design
the utility function of player n based on pricing techniques
[30], given by
Un(xn,x−n) =
∑
k∈K
[Cn,k (xn,k,x−n)− λn,kxn,k] (17)
where dn,k = 1 − e−xn,k , and λn,k is regarded as a penalty
price to prevent devices from always trying to access the chan-
nel and causing a heavy collision [31]. To this end, we give
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, to prove the existence and uniqueness
of NE of the new game G′ = [N , {xn}n∈N , {Un}n∈N ].
Lemma 1. Un(xn,x−n) is a concave function of xn.
Proof. The first-order derivative of Un with respect to xn,k is
∂Un
∂xn,k
=
e−xn,kΦn,k(x−n)
θn,kTs (1− Φn,k(x−n) + e−xn,kΦn,k(x−n))−λn,k
(18)
and the second-order derivative of Un with respect to xn,k is
∂2Un
∂2xn,k
=
exn,k (Φn,k(x−n)− 1) Φn,k(x−n)
θn,kTs(exn,k + Φn,k(x−n)− exn,kΦn,k(x−n))2
.
(19)
According to (16), we have 0 < Φ1(x−n) < 1, and ∂
2Un
∂2xn,k
<
0. The second-order partial derivative of Un, ∂
2Un
∂xn,k∂xn,k′
, is
zero. As a result, the Hessian matrix of Un is negative. Thus,
this concludes the proof.
Lemma 2. Un(xn,x−n) is a sub-modular function.
Proof. The second-order derivative of Un with respect to xn,k
and xj,k′ , j 6= n, is given by
∂Un
∂xn,k∂xj,k′
=
∂
∂xj,k′
 e−xn,k
θn,kTs
(
1
Φn,k(x−n)
− 1 + e−xn,k
)

=
e−xn,k
θn,kTs
(
1
Φn,k(x−n)
− 1 + e−xn,k
)2 1
Φn,k(x−n)
2
∂Φn,k(x−n)
∂xj,k′
.
(20)
According to (16), we have ∂Φn,k(x−n)∂xj,k′ < 0. As a result,
∂2Un
∂xn,k∂xj,k′
< 0. Since Un(xn,x−n) is twice differentiable,
and ∂
2Un
∂xn,k∂xj,k′
< 0, the utility function Un(xn,x−n) is a
sub-modular function [32].
Informally, the sub-modularity of the game implies that
the best-response of player n is a non-increasing function of
another players’ decision [32]. The strict mathematic proof is
given in the following.
Theorem 2 (NE Existence). The game G′ =[N , {xn}n∈N , {Un}n∈N ] has at least one pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium {x∗n,k,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K}.
Proof. For every player, dn,k is within the interval
[dmin, dmax]. Thus, we have − ln(1−dmin) ≤ xn,k ≤ − ln(1−
dmax). Let xmin = − ln(1−dmin) and xmax = − ln(1−dmax).
Obviously, set xn,k ∈ [xmin, xmax] is compact and convex.
The utility function Un(xn, x−n) is a continuous function of
probability vector xn. In addition, Un(xn,x−n) is a concave
function of xn (See Lemma 1). According to theorem 3.2 in
[33], we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3. The best-response function of player n is given
by
xn,k = bn,k(x−n)
=
[
ln
(
1
λn,kθn,kTs
−1
)
−ln
(
1
Φn,k(x−n)
−1
)]xmax
xmin
(21)
and is a decreasing function of x−n, where [x]xmaxxmin =
min [max (x, xmin) , xmax].
Proof. Intuitively, the best-response function of player n is the
point at which the derivative of Un(xn,x−n) with respect to
xn,k equals zero. According to (18), it can be calculated by
e−xn,kΦn,k(x−n)
θn,kTs (1− Φn,k(x−n) + e−xn,kΦn,k(x−n)) = λn,k. (22)
After some algebraic manipulation, (21) can be obtained,
which decreases with x−n. This is because
∂bn,k(x−n)
∂xj,k′
=
1
Φn,k(x−n)− Φn,k(x−n)2
∂Φn,k(x−n)
∂xj,k′
.
where 0 < Φn,k(x−n) < 1 and
∂Φn,k(x−n)
∂xj,k′
< 0, and we have
∂bn,k(x−n)
∂xj,k′
< 0. The proof is accomplished.
6Note that Theorem 3 provides the best-response function of
device n, which needs its information (including the penalty
price λn,k, the QoS requirement θn,k, and the channel condi-
tion Hn), and also needs exchange information (more specifi-
cally, the activation probability ~x−n) to calculate Φn,k(~x−n).
Assume that xn,k can be quantified by s bits. As a result,
the total overhead at a iteration could has KNs. To further
reduce the overhead, we propose the following fully distributed
algorithm.
According to Lemma 2 and Theorem 3, a greedy updating
algorithm is developed to iteratively search the Nash equi-
librium point. At iteration t, each player chooses the best
strategy in respond to the opponent strategy chosen in iteration
t − 1. Note that the iteration times do not correspond to the
time slots of our proposed protocol. The duration of iterations
can be very smaller than the superframe duration, as long
as the exchange information is delivered. For the game of
the minimization of sub-modular cost function, the greedy
updating algorithm is proved to converge monotonically to
an equilibrium (the equilibrium depends on the initial state
of the algorithm) [34], [35]. However, the conclusion cannot
fit to the maximization of sub-modular utility function. In the
following, we prove the convergence of the algorithm in the
case of maximization of sub-modular utility function, and the
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Theorem 4 (Convergence and Uniqueness). Consider a non-
cooperative game, where the payoff functions are sub-modular,
players maximize the objective function, and the strategy
spaces are continuous and compact. Then, the following hold:
1) If player n initially uses the policy satisfying x0n,k ≤
bn,k(x
∗
−n) and x
0
n,k < x
2
n,k (x
0
n,k ≥ bn,k(x∗−n) and
x0n,k > x
2
n,k), ∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K, the sequence
{xtn,k}t=0,1,2,... generated by the greedy updating al-
gorithm converges to an Nash equilibrium {x∗n,k,∀n ∈
N ,∀k ∈ K}.
2) The Nash equilibrium {x∗n,k,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K} is
unique.
Proof. We first prove item 1). According to the existence
theorem, there is a Nash equilibrium, denoted by {x∗n,k,∀n ∈
N ,∀k ∈ K}, satisfying x∗n,k = bn,k(x∗−n). The initial point
is assume to satisfy x0n,k ≤ bn,k(x∗−n),∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K. Due
to decreasing property of the best-response function, we have
x0n,k ≤ bn,k(x∗−n) = x∗−n,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K
x1n,k = bn,k(x
0
−n) ≥ bn,k(x∗−n) = x∗−n,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K
x2n,k = bn,k(x
1
−n) ≤ bn,k(x∗−n) = x∗−n,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K
x3n,k = bn,k(x
2
−n) ≥ bn,k(x∗−n) = x∗−n,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K
· · ·
x2tn,k = bn,k(x
2t−1
−n ) ≤ bn,k(x∗−n) = x∗−n,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K
x2t+1n,k = bn,k(x
2t
−n) ≥ bn,k(x∗−n) = x∗−n,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K.
(23)
As a result, we can observe that the sequence
{xtn,k − x∗n,k}t=0,1,2,...,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K, is an alternating
sequence whose terms alternate in sign. Stated otherwise,
the original sequence {xtn,k}t=0,1,2,... oscillates at the Nash
equilibrium {x∗n,k}. In addition, we can observe that if
x2n,k − x0n,k > 0, the following inequations are satisfied:
x3n,k − x1n,k = bn,k(x2−n)− bn,k(x0−n) < 0,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K
x4n,k − x2n,k = bn,k(x3−n)− bn,k(x1−n) > 0,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K
· · ·
x2t−1n,k −x2t−3−n =bn,k(x2t−2−n )− bn,k(x2t−4−n ) < 0,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K
x2tn,k−x2t−2−n =bn,k(x2t−1−n )− bn,k(x2t−3−n ) > 0,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K.
(24)
According to (23) and (24), the sub-sequence
{x2tn,k}t=0,1,2,...,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K, increases with t,
and the upper bound is {x∗n,k}. Similarly, the sub-sequence
{x2t−1n,k }t=1,2,...,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K, decreases with t, and the
lower bound is {x∗n,k}. As a result, there is a positive integer
t such that for ∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ K, we have
∣∣∣xtn,k − xt−1−n ∣∣∣ ≤ ζ,
where ζ is a small positive real number and the vertical
bars denote the absolute value. Stated otherwise, the original
sequence {xtn,k}t=0,1,2,... is a Cauchy sequence, which
converges to the Nash equilibrium.
As discussed precedingly, the convergence of the algorithm
needs to be guaranteed, satisfying that x2n,k−x0n,k > 0. Thus,
we redesign the iteration, given by
x2n,k =
{
bn,k(x
1
−n),when bn,k(x
1
−n) > x
0
n,k
x0n,k + δ,when bn,k(x
1
−n) ≤ x0n,k
(25)
where δ is a small positive real number. For the case of x0n,k ≥
bn,k(x
∗
−n) and x
0
n,k > x
2
n,k, similar proof can be obtained.
Next, we proceed to prove item 2). Suppose {x∗n,k} and
{x∗∗n,k} are distinct Nash equilibriums, satisfying x∗n,k =
bn,k
(
x∗−n
)
and x∗∗n,k = bn,k
(
x∗∗−n
)
, respectively. Without
loss of generality, we assume there exist n and k such that
x∗∗n,k < x
∗
n,k. Hence, there exists α > 1 such that for some n
and k, αx∗∗n,k > x
∗
n,k and that for other n and k, αx
∗∗
n,k = x
∗
n,k.
Thus, with n and k satisfying αx∗∗n,k = x
∗
n,k, we have
αbn,k
(
x∗∗n,k
)
= bn,k
(
x∗n,k
)
. (26)
Since there exists at least one n′ and k′ such that αx∗∗n′,k′ >
x∗n′,k′ , we have αx
∗∗
−n > x
∗
−n. According to the decreasing
property of the best-response function, we have
bn,k
(
αx∗∗−n
)
< bn,k
(
x∗−n
)
. (27)
Due to contradiction, we infer the uniqueness of Nash equi-
librium.
As the algorithm requires all the devices’ information, we
propose the following fully distributed algorithm. Substituting
(5) into (16), we have
Φn,k(x−n) =
(
1− EHn{e−θn,krn,kSn,k}
) F˜n,ks
1− e−xn,k (28)
where F˜n,ks = (1− εn)Fn,ks is an estimated successful access
probability, and can be obtained by observing the environment,
i.e., counting the acknowledgement (ACK) sent by the BS
[36]. In this way, we do not need to estimate the empty
buffer probability and exchange the information with other
devices. The channel state information (CSI) can be estimated
at the BS, and usually quantized and fed back to the device.
Substituting (28) into (21), we obtain a fully distributed best-
response function, requiring local information, such as current
7Algorithm 1 A distributed best-response-based algorithm for
the k-th queue of the n-th device
1: Initialize xn,k[0], t = 0 and the error ξ.
2: repeat
3: Estimate current channel state and the successful access
probability. Update Φn,k(x−n) using (28).
4: t← t+ 1.
5: Update xn,k[t] using (21).
6: until |xn,k[t]− xn,k[t− 1]| ≤ ξ
channel state and the estimated successful access probability.
Thus, each device iterates by itself using the fully distributed
best-response function, instead of exchanging information
among devices. The proposed algorithm is explicitly described
in Algorithm 1.
B. Local Optimal Price
The price selection λn,k is of importance to maximize the
effective capacity. A smaller λn,k implies frequent access
attempts, making the signalling more conflicted. However, a
larger λn,k prevents more devices from accessing the BS.
Hence, an appropriate price is necessary to the game.
The local optimal price can be obtained by comparing the
Lagrangian of the centralized optimization problem (P1) and
that of the maximization of each player’s utility. The problem
can be reformulated as
(P2) : min
{xn,k}
−
∑
n∈N
∑
k∈K
Cn,k (xn,k,x−n)
s.t. xmin ≤ xn,k ≤ xmax.
(29)
The Lagrangian function of (P2) is given by
L1 =
∑
n∈N
∑
k∈K
{−Cn,k (xn,k,x−n) + (σn,k − νn,k)xn,k
+νn,kxmin − σn,kxmax}
(30)
where σn,k and νn,k are the Lagrange multipliers for the con-
straints. Let xopt be the optimal device activation probability.
The first order KKT condition is given by
∂L1
∂xn,k
∣∣∣∣
x=xopt
=− ∂Cn,k (xn,k,x−n)
∂xn,k
∣∣∣∣
x=xopt
+ σn,k − νn,k
−
∑
m6=n,m∈N
∑
b∈K
∂Cm,b (xm,b,x−m)
∂xn,k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=xopt
= 0.
(31)
The maximization of each player’s utility can be formulated
as
(P3) : max
{xn,k}
Un (xn,k,x−n)
s.t. xmin ≤ xn,k ≤ xmax.
(32)
The Lagrangian function of (P3) is given by
L2 =
∑
k∈K
{− (Cn,k − λn,kxn,k) + (σ′n,k − ν′n,k)xn,k
+ν′n,kxmin − σ′n,kxmax}
(33)
where σ′n,k and ν
′
n,k are the Lagrange multipliers for the
constraints. Let x∗ be the NE point. The first order KKT
condition for each player’s utility at the NE point is
∂L2
∂xn,k
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
=− ∂Cn,k(xn,k,x−n)
∂xn,k
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
+ λn,k
+ σ′n,k − ν′n,k= 0.
(34)
By comparing (31) with (34), we find that they are equiva-
lent if
λn,k = −
∑
m 6=n,m∈N
∑
b∈K
∂Cm,b (xm,b,x−m)
∂xn,k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
x=xopt
. (35)
Denote
f(x) = −
∑
m 6=n,m∈N
∑
b∈K
∂Cm,b (xm,b,x−m)
∂xn,k
=
1
Ts
1
1−Dn 1M
1
M
k−1∏
j=1
Pn,jidle (1− Pn,kidle )e−xn,k
∑
m6=n,m∈N
∑
b∈K
1
θm,b
(1− e−xm,b)Φm,b(x−m)
1− (1− e−xm,b)Φm,b(x−m) .
(36)
Note that (36) needs some exchange information (more specif-
ically, the activation probability x−n and the channel condition
Hn). We assume BS can assist to update λn,k. Thus, the
channel condition only exchange one time with the BS. And
at each iteration, the activation probability x−n should be
exchange with the BS, and the BS seed λn,k to devices to
improve the performance.
We can update the price as follows:
λn,k[t+ 1] = (1− ρt)λn,k[t] + ρtfn,k(x), (37)
where the step-size ρ is a decreasing sequence.
Through updating the price using (37) and the best-response
function using (21), a price-update algorithm is developed to
obtain the local optimality, as described in Algorithm 2. The
convergence proof of Algorithm 2 is challenging considering
the dynamic price in the game. We can provide a undemanding
proof of convergence for our algorithm. When the number of
iterations is large, the price λn,k[t] tends to steady. As a result,
according to Theorem 4, given a fixed price, the algorithm
can fast converge to the NE point. Note that, due to the non-
convexity of (P2), Algorithm 2 only solves for local optimal
solutions. In other words, there are some saddle points or KKT
points of (P2), and the final solution of Algorithm 2 depends
on the selection of initial points.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are provided. First, we
evaluate the performance of the mMTC system using the
proposed effective capacity. Then, the convergence and effec-
tiveness of the distributed barring policy for maximizing each
device’s utility is demonstrated. Finally, we provide the results
using the proposed price-update algorithm for total effective
capacity maximization.
In our simulations, the BS is located in the center of an area
of 500× 500 m2 and the devices are randomly and uniformly
8Algorithm 2 A price-update algorithm
1: Initialize xn,k[0], t = 0 and error bound ξ.
2: repeat
3: t← t+ 1.
4: Update the price using (37).
5: for n ∈ N , k ∈ K do
6: Update xn,k[t] using (21).
7: end for
8: until |x[t]− x[t− 1]| ≤ ξ
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Fig. 3. The average effective capacity of one device versus the preambles
resources and the data transmission resources.
distributed with in this area. The number of traffic types is
K = 2, and the average packet length is L = 500 bits. The
QoS requirement of traffic type 1 is θn,1 = 10−3, n ∈ N , and
that of traffic type 2 is θn,2 = 10−5, n ∈ N . Set dkmin = 0.1
and dkmax = 0.9, k = 1, 2. The activating probability of traffic
type 1 is dn,1 = 0.9, n ∈ N , and that of traffic type 2 is
dn,2 = 0.5, n ∈ N . The duration of a transmission frame
is Tu = 4 ms, and that of data transmission is Tf = 3 ms.
The slot Td is 0.5 ms.The transmit power of each device is
10 dBm. The noise spectral density is −174 dBm/Hz. The
large-scale path loss is PLn = 60+37.6lg(Xn), where Xn is
the distance from the n-th device to the BS. The packet error
probability εn,k = 10−5. Each point of results is the average
of 200 independent runs.
A. Performance analysis of the proposed effective capacity
In Fig. 3, we evaluate the joint impact of the preambles
resources and data transmission resources on the effective
capacity of mMTC. The number of devices is N = 100. The
duration of a symbol is a = 66.7 µs and the bandwidth of a
symbol is set to 15 KHz. We can evaluate the effective capacity
by varying preamble number M and transmission bandwidth
Bn. We observe that the effective capacity grows with the
preamble resources and the bandwidth in both cases of traffic
types. Hence, we can joint allocate the two resources to meet
the QoS requirements of devices.
Fig. 4 shows the performance of mMTC in terms of different
QoS requirements. In Fig. 4(a), we evaluate the average
effective capacity with an increasing QoS exponent of traffic
type 1, given θn,2 = 10−6. It is shown that the effective
capacity of traffic type 1 decreases with QoS exponent of
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Fig. 4. The average effective capacity of one device versus different QoS
requirements: (a) Given QoS requirement of traffic type 2, dn,2 = 10−6; (b)
Given QoS requirement of traffic type 1, dn,2 = 10−3.
traffic type 1, θn,1, and is sensitive to θn,1 within the region
10−4 ≤ θn,1 ≤ 10−2. On the contrary, the effective capacity of
traffic type 2 decreases with θn,1. This is because the larger
θn,1, the larger the queue idle probability of traffic type 1.
Thus, the traffic type 2 has a higher access probability. In
Fig. 4(b), we evaluate the average effective capacity with an
increasing QoS exponent of traffic type 2, given dn,1 = 10−3.
The observation is similar to that from Fig. 4(a).
B. Convergence and performance of the distributed barring
policy
In Fig. 5, we investigate the convergence of Algorithm 1,
where λn,k = 1000, Sn,k = 1000, and M = 50. We assume
that the successful access probability of each device can be
accurately estimated. In Fig 5, we can observe that Algorithm
1 converges fast to the same NE point regardless of the initial
point, which can be verified by the property of the game, as
discussed in Section IV.A.
Fig. 6 shows the total effective capacity of Algorithm 1 with
different penalty prices, compared with the fixed activating
probability. The simulation parameters are the same as those
for Fig. 5. It is shown that Algorithm 1 is superior to other
strategies. This is because our proposed algorithm can search
the NE point. We also observe that the penalty price has
an important influence on the total effective capacity, as
mentioned earlier. There is an optimal price to maximize the
total effective capacity.
C. Convergence and performance of the price-update barring
policy
In Fig. 7, we investigate the convergence of Algorithm
2, where Sn,k = 1000, and M = 50. We observe that
Algorithm 2 converges fast to the local optimal point. Fig. 8
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shows the performance of different algorithms. Compared with
the centralized particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm,
we can find the gain gap is slight between the centralized
algorithm and our proposed distributed algorithm. However,
our proposed distributed algorithm can fast converge within
limited iterations. The price-fixed algorithm 1 cannot leverage
device disparity and spatial diversity, resulting in a lower total
effective capacity than that of price-update algorithm 2. We
also observe that, when the number of iterations is small,
the gap between the two algorithms becomes bigger because
the preamble resources are so scarce that the lower the price
becomes, the severer the collisions become. An appropriate
price will alleviate the burst arrivals.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate a hybrid random access and
data transmission protocol design to guarantee the end-to-
end QoS of different types of traffic for mMTC. First, we
derive a novel effective capacity based on a priority-queueing-
based ACB policy. With the proposed effective capacity, the
barring policy can be modeled as a non-cooperative game.
A distributed iterative algorithm that converges to the NE is
then proposed. To further improve the efficiency of NE, we
provide a price-update algorithm, which converges to a local
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optimal point for the effective capacity optimization problem.
Simulation results demonstrate the performance of the novel
effective capacity, and verify the convergence and the gains of
our proposed algorithms.
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